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I. INTRODUCTION
Homosexuality is today essentially a form of political, social, and moral dis-
sent on par with the best American traditions of dissent and even subversive
advocacy.... Those that support criminalization find today in homosexuality
what they found before in the family planning of Sanger, the atheism of
Darwin, the socialism of Debs, or the Marxist advocacy of the American
Communist Party.1
Ostensibly, the First Amendment guarantees all people free-
dom of expression of every belief. The free exchange of ideas forms
the basis of a democratic government.2 Only citizens with unhindered
access to the famed "marketplace of ideas" can participate meaning-
fully in a dialogue and achieve political and social solutions that the
community will respect.3 For this reason, courts balk at even the
suggestion of limiting expression that might function as political or
social advocacy.
Despite the seemingly boundless tolerance our judiciary pur-
ports to extend to all ideas, however, courts deny much expression the
full protection of the First Amendment because of the expression's
1. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy and Homosexual Love, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 895, 905 (1986).
2. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L. J.
877, 882-84 (1963); Donald Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 Georgetown
L. J. 234, 235, 262 (1966).
3. First Amendment theory has described free speech as a 'marketplace of ideas" for many
years. This metaphor suggests that every individual has the right to sell her ideas to the masses.
Success or failure is dependent on the value that the buyers ascribe to the product. This model of
the First Amendment suggests that a maximum amount of speech on a given issue will allow
people the opportunity to judge the merits of various ideas and, consequently, achieve enlighten-
ment as to the most preferential. Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 1.02[A] at
1.7 to 1-9 (Matthew Bender, 1984). As a result, courts review speech advocating a view of
political or societal organization more carefully than other noncore speech.
Significant support exists for another rationale of free speech-the self-fulfillment function.
Id. § 1.03 at 1-49 to 1-52. This concept suggests that the importance of the First Amendment
derives not only from the ability of speech to persuade others but also from the need to express
our own personal identities and grow to enlightenment. C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964,990-92 (1978).
Although this Note assumes the "classical" model of the First Amendment embodied in
Nimmer's Enlightenment Model, incorporation of the Self-Fulfillment Model would not weaken
the argument for expanding the interpretation of expression. In fact, this change would add
greater weight to the ideas that follow. For a further discussion of the similarities and differences
between these two views of the First Amendment, see Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 998-
1002 (Foundation, 12th ed. 1991).
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form and content. Specifically, courts exclude from protection speech
deemed not to contribute significantly to the civil discourse of ideas
that the First Amendment seeks to maintain. For example, the
Supreme Court has excluded from protection "fighting words,"N obscen-
ity,5 sexual harassment,6 and the advocacy of illegal acts.7  Thus, the
Supreme Court has determined that certain classes of speech, al-
though arguably expressive, do not advocate concepts protected by the
First Amendment.
The First Amendment does not protect those messages viewed
as mere words or conduct without any expressive content.8
Accordingly, the Court has held that some speech is not advocacy, but
mere words or acts without expressive significance. This distinction
ensures that the might of the First Amendment is not invoked in the
name of mere words not representing advocacy of some political or
social belief.
Inherent in these limitations on the freedom of expression is
the line drawn between reasonable, rational expression intended to
spark civil debate and irrational ranting viewed as outside the bounds
of true expression. Rational speech is protected as a form of political
4. The category of "fighting words" is speech that prevents the free exchange of ideas by
directly provoking an individual to conflict. The Court views this speech as adding nothing to the
exchange of ideas. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state statute forbidding statements that may arouse the addressee to
violence). The Court in Chaplinsky noted: 'It has been well observed that such utterances ... are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' Id., (footnote omitted).
For a more thorough description of the "fighting words" doctrine, see notes 86-88 and
accompanying text. See Part III.A.2 for the criticism of this exclusion.
5. The Court denies First Amendment protection to obscenity under the belief that this
sort of expression adds nothing of value to the rational exchange of ideas. Speech is defined as
"obscene" if it fails the test adopted in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (denoting
"patently offensive" descriptions of sexual conduct, appealing to the "prurient interest in sex,"
that lack "serious ... value"). For a further description of this test, see notes 103-09 and accom-
panying text.
6. Courts perceive that sexual harassment has such slight value to the advocacy of beliefs
that it may be excluded from protection.
7. The advocacy of illegal acts undermines lawful behavior. Illegal conduct is contrary to
the rational advocacy of ideas that the marketplace theory presupposes. Consequently, the Court
has denied protection to speech that meets the test outlined in Justice Holmes's dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (formulating the
"clear and imminent danger" test). See, for example, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-
10 (1951); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S.
290, 298 (1961).
8. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (categorizing fighting words as outside the protection of the
First Amendment); R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992) (analogizing fighting
words to the sound of a noisy truck); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (refusing to
recognize any significant message in George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue). But see Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (recognizing the expressive value inherent in an offensive
slogan). See generally Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 3 (cited in note 3).
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or social advocacy. Irrational speech is denied First Amendment
protection on the grounds that it expresses ideas unprotected by the
First Amendment or that it is not true expression at all. By drawing
this arbitrary line between rational and irrational, however, advocates
of this interpretation of the First Amendment often foreclose the
expression of others who seek to advocate unreasonable or irrational
beliefs. The definition of "Reason"9 is invariably one that espouses a
view of civil discourse that rationally weighs the values of competing
beliefs.10 The civil discourse model of speech envisions a moderated
political debate searching for the truth. This interpretation does not
tolerate expression falling outside its model of rationality."
Expression such as that of black activists staging lunch counter sit-ins
and freedom rides seems anathema to this ideal of rationality. This
expression frustrates any attempt to engage in civil discourse aimed
at a solution. It exhibits "irrational" defiance of the majoritarian rule
and consequently is denied First Amendment protection.12 Yet, these
actions are just as expressive as other, more fully protected modes of
speech.
Instead of ensuring that the First Amendment is not prosti-
tuted in the name of activities that are nonexpressive, these prohibi-
tions actually frustrate the basic tenets of the Constitution.
Expression that runs counter to the basic beliefs of society often is
denied protected status and instead is viewed as the bastard child of
true speech. Much expression that the majority considers irrational is
9. "Reason" and "Unreason" are capitalized to represent the view of these concepts as
socially constructed categories of speech. See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons:
Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. l. L. Rev. 95, 100 (describing
the terms "Reason" and "Unreason" as social constructs).
10. See id.
11. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(expressing a noble and eloquent argument in favor of an unhindered discourse of all opinions and
exhortations); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (affirming an espionage conviction
for Socialist, anti-war speech); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (affirming the
defendant's conviction for printing and mailing a circular to draftees urging them to assert their
Thirteenth Amendment rights and their opposition to the Conscription Act). See also Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-10 (1940) (finding the defendant's playing of an anti-Catholic
recording, with permission, and without any intent to provoke violence, protected by the First
Amendment despite subsequent threats from listeners that caused him to depart peacefully);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 94-95 (1940) (finding the defendant's peaceful picketing and
inducing other workers to join him in a strike at a "company town" to be within the First
Amendment's protection of the "processes of education" and "fearless reasoning"). See generally
Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society ch. 2 (Oxford U., 1986). In some instances, the Court has
been willing to move beyond the civic debate model that Karst outlines, but rarely does it offer full
protection to truly fringe forms of speech.
12. The Court in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), upheld the right to political
protest by means of a sit-in, but this mode of expression continued to suffer at the hands of its
detractors.
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the very sort of speech the First Amendment must protect. Courts,
however, often are unable and unwilling to recognize and accept some
valid forms of expression. Instead of protecting these speakers of
Unreason, courts have devalued their messages and allowed the
eradication of their voices and beliefs.
The problem facing speakers of Unreason is especially acute in
the context of the struggle of gay men and lesbian women1 3 to achieve
liberation from the dominant culture's prison of heterosexuality.14
Because theirs is often the most silent minority with aims so disparate
from the beliefs of the rest of society, the expression of homosexual
men and women is particularly susceptible to the majority's brand of
Unreason.5 This Note exposes the inherent difficulties faced by gay
men and lesbians in their struggle to express values and beliefs
particular to their orientation. Although it is inherently difficult for
someone in the majority to recognize as rational expression it may
consider the language of Unreason,16 the legal system must confront
this task. Only by an expansive interpretation of the First
13. Many writers have debated how to identify most accurately members of the homosexual
community. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1508, 1512 nn.5-6 (1989) (discussing various conceptions surrounding the terms "homosexuality,"
"sexual orientation," and 'gay men and lesbians"). This Note makes no attempt to resolve this is-
sue definitively. However, this Note often intentionally uses the words "gay," 'lesbian," and
'homosexual" as adjectives rather than nouns to emphasize the expression involved in this aspect
of an individual's personality.
14. Jos6 G6mez argues that cultural biases often force homosexual men and women to hide
their sexual orientation under a veneer of heterosexuality to avoid social and legal ramifications.
He refers to this state of affairs as "compelled heterosexuality." Jos6 G6mez, The Public
Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 Law & Ineq. J. 121, 134 (1983).
15. John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual
Minority in the United States, 1940-1970 at 13-15 (U. of Chicago, 1983). See Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1201-02 (E.D. Va. 1975) (refusing to
extend the constitutional right to privacy to cover sodomy); Velez-Lorzano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305,
1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding consensual sodomy to be a crime of moral turpitude sufficient to
demand deportation); In re Schmidt, 56 Misc. 2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)
(denying naturalization to an alien who admitted lesbian practices). See also McConnell v.
Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971) (referring to homosexuality as a "repugnant moral
concept"); State v. Bonanno, 245 La. 1117, 163 S.2d 72, 74 (1964) (describing homosexual acts as
'loathsome and disgusting"); State v. Stokes, 274 N.C. 409, 163 S.E.2d 770, 774 (1968) (citing to
the Bible as evidence that homosexuality has been condemned since ancient times).
16. Kenneth Karst describes this problem quite perceptively: "Ignoring that our own
perspectives are perspectives, 'we' simply think of them as neutral and abstract Reason." Karst,
1990 U. M. L. Rev. at 100 (cited in note 9) (emphasis in original). Witness the concept of false
consciousness in feminist argument, suggesting that a male-centered view of the world has
shaped and defined many women's perception of reality. See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 636-37 (1983). It
is common for those who disagree with a particular viewpoint to try to suppress that opinion. A
conflict with someone whose world view is entirely inconsistent is frustrating and difficult
because it goes against common sense. Karst, 1990 U. M. L. Rev. at 100.
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Amendment's definition of "expression" may the homosexual commu-
nity enjoy the true protections mandated by the Constitution.
Part II of this Note explores the underlying concepts of the
First Amendment and its unflagging protection of all forms of valid
expression. It also highlights those limitations on the civil discourse
model that the Court deems necessary to ensure an ordered society.
Finally, Part II chronicles the First Amendment's struggle to define
the line between valid expression and the speech of Unreason.
Part III examines the dangers to free expression posed by the
current interpretation of the First Amendment, suggesting that
"valid" and "reasonable" are arbitrary, if not entirely inappropriate,
labels to attach to expression. The judiciary's inability to comprehend,
and consequently shield, expression of the homosexual community
from the winds of the democratic ideal demonstrates these problems.
When challenged by majoritarian influences, a great deal of the homo-
sexual community's expression receives inadequate First Amendment
protection from the courts. Part III also argues that the current view
of the First Amendment creates a chilling effect on this type of ex-
pression, discouraging even initial expression of disfavored ideas.
Part IV argues for an expansive interpretation of protected
expression and suggests methods through which the legal community
can implement this approach. Only an expansive notion of expression
will give heretofore limited forms of speech the full credence of the
marketplace. In addition, Part IV responds to other commentators'
criticisms.
Finally, this Note advocates an expansive interpretation of
expression to abolish many of the current restraints on fringe
expression. The marketplace would benefit from the broader class of
ideas that would result when previously silent voices begin to speak.
A more liberal view of expression would open the doors not only for
homosexual expression, but also for other fringe beliefs. The buyers
and sellers in a truly free market, and not the courts, are in the best
position to value speech.
1078 [47:1073
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PROTECTIONS AND LIMITS
A. Protections on Speech
1. The Purpose and Scope of the First Amendment
The First Amendment ensures that people may air all speech
and that the majority will not attempt to silence speech that chal-
lenges its power. This view relies on the classical interpretation of the
First Amendment as a tool in the search for political and social truth.17
Some scholars who emphasize the importance of speech to the indi-
vidual challenge this view.18  Under any interpretation of the First
Amendment, the expression of homosexual individuals must receive
full protection. This expression certainly advances the goal of self-
flfillment and growth. Free speech also affects society's valuation of
gay men and lesbians and political decisions on homosexual issues.
Before seeking to delve into the theory of the First Amendment
and to expose its flaws, it is important to examine the underpinnings
of this doctrine carefully. At its core, the First Amendment fully
protects all actions and words that the judiciary determines to be
within the definition of expression. 19 This is an inclusive category,
covering much that the general populace may not consider to be true
speech.20 In addition to a broad interpretation of protected speech, the
17. The "classical" view suggests that free speech is a necessary element to allow people to
make informed decisions about political issues. Most scholars recognize a broad realm of political
issues requiring free speech. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-
Government 94 (Harper, 1948) (arguing for First Amendment protection of all speech on matters
of public interest). See also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 521, 631 (suggesting that nonpolitical speech should be protected, but at a
lower level than political speech). Others, however, maintain a narrow view of speech that is nec-
essary to the political process. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 20 (1971) (according protection only to speech that is
'explicitly political'). The Supreme Court also clearly protects nonpolitical speech concerning
public issues. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231-32 (1977) (protecting the rights of
teachers to engage in collective bargaining); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (upholding
the First Amendment protection of reports on matters of public interest, even if negligently false).
18. See Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 1.03 at 1-51 (cited in note 3); Laurence H.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12.1 at 788-89 (Foundation, 1988).
19. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 3.06[B][1] at 3-38 to 3-43 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the courts' treatment of symbolic speech). See also Clark r). Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1983) (finding sleeping in a park to constitute protected expres-
sion).
20. 'The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of 'speech,' but we have
long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word." Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (defining burning of the United States flag as a form of
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Court has construed the First Amendment to ensure the freedom of
expression against regulation that only accidently hinders speech.
21
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech."2 2  This language creates a broad
negative proscription against any intrusion on speech. All speech is
presumptively valid; government shall deny none.2 The Supreme
Court interprets this imperative to create a broad zone of protection,
ensuring that all valid speech will escape unlawful suppression. 24
Although courts and theorists have recognized that some ex-
clusions from protection are imperative to ensure the continued valid-
ity of the First Amendment and the Constitution itself,25 other excep-
tions mirror the vague desire of society to limit certain expression that
it considers particularly offensive.26 Consequently, the Court ex-
pressly has construed the First Amendment to overprotect speech.2 7
To ensure that no fringe expression is suppressed, the Court inter-
expression). The Court has recognized that certain conduct is expressive. See, for example,
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (demonstrations); Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing an armband); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991)
(nude dancing); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(fundraising); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (civil rights demonstrations);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (labor picketing); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983) (distribution of pamphlets). See also Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-7 at 827-28
(cited in note 18) (discussing the expression-conduct distinction and its limitations); Laura L.
Goodman, Shacking Up with the First Amendment: Symbolic Expression and the Public
University, 64 Ind. L. J. 711, 717-21 (1989).
21. Some laws regulating nonexpressive activities also may interfere with the right to free
speech. See, for example, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (invalidating an ordinance
that prohibited the distribution of leaflets in an effort to prevent litter and clogged storm drains).
22. U.S. Const., Amend. I.
23. Some textualists carry this position to extremes. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1243-44
(1987) (arguing that the text of the Constitution should be dispositive when a coherent interpre-
tation cannot be achieved).
24. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948) (holding that the First Amendment
protects a speaker from conviction for breach of the peace).
25. See, for example, Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 24-35 (cited in note 17). "Speech advocating
violent overthrow [of the government] is thus not 'political speech' as that term must be defined
by a Madisonian system of government. It is not political speech because it violates constitutional
truths about processes and because it is not aimed at a new definition of political truth by a
legislative majority." Id. at 31. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-11 (1951) (finding
no First Amendment violation in the defendant's conviction for conspiring to organize the
Communist Party and for teaching Marxist-Leninist doctrine); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925) (upholding a conviction for publishing a Socialist newspaper calling for "revolutionary
mass action").
26. Society's desire to limit beliefs it considers antithetical to a common moral, logical, and
social baseline relates back to its inability to recognize any value in Unreason. See note 16. See,
for example, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748.50 (1978) (denying First Amendment
protection to comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue).
27. See Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 3.03[B][2] at 3-18 to 3-19 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the Court's protection of false information).
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prets the First Amendment to eliminate the danger of over-regulation
and the self-censorship that may result.
Judges applying the First Amendment's prohibitions to specific
instances of expression may be compelled to allow the limitation of
speech that the majority may wish to suppress. Consequently, the
Supreme Court often protects seemingly unworthy speech to prevent
any hint of over-regulation. 28 For example, the Court routinely pro-
tects literature and art under the First Amendment even though
much of this speech contains no element of political or social advo-
cacy.29 The Court, however, insists on drawing the circle of protected
material broadly to ensure that anything deserving protection will be
included within it. The danger of excluding any valid speech over-
shadows the costs of protecting some invalid speech.
A hidden danger confronting free speech is the chilling effect of
over-regulation. People wishing to express counter-majoritarian
beliefs often may stifle their own speech out of fear of prosecution. If
the distinction between protected and punishable speech is a fine one,
the potential penalty for crossing that line will deter fringe expression.
For example, there is little doubt that others were deterred from
similar advocacy 3° after the Supreme Court affirmed Anita Whitney's
conviction of a felony under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act of
1919 for her participation in the Communist Labor Party.31 Thus, to
ensure the full range of expression, the Court seeks to minimize the
First Amendment's exclusions and overprotect fringe expression.
Protected speech may contain ideas that arouse fear, disgust,
and even anger and hatred. The First Amendment, however, protects
speech that the majority may reject so that everyone is assured the
opportunity to participate in the free exchange of ideas.32 Thus, de-
28. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974) (protecting false statements to ensure
against any chilling effect).
29. See Schad v. Mount Ephriam, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (protecting "live entertain-
ment," including nude dancing); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the First Amendment's applicability to topics lacking "ideas
of social and political significance').
30. See generally Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower:. McCarthyism and the Universities
(Oxford U., 1986) (discussing the sileiicing of academic debate that resulted from fear of
accusations of Communist activity).
31. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927). Although current scholars may
criticize the Court's decision, nothing can change the time Anita Whitney spent in jail for treason.
See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951) (affirming the defendant's conviction
for advocating the overthrow of the government and organizing a society for that purpose).
32. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Holmes stated: "[W]hen men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
1994] 1081
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spite widespread opposition to their position, even such unabashed
hatred as the anti-Semitic marches of Nazis in Skokie, Illinois has
received First Amendment protection.33  The voting power of those
having majoritarian and reasonable viewpoints ensures them a forum
for their opinions. The First Amendment, however, exists to protect
the voiceless and disempowered who may be silenced by the
community's intolerance.
3 4
2. Different Levels of First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court affords disparate levels of protection to
different classes of speech. Pure political speech receives absolute
protection from governmental interference. 35 Political speech, as a
means of achieving political truth, is the very sort of expression that
the Framers envisioned the First Amendment protecting.36 The con-
tinuing vitality of the democratic system relies on the free exchange of
ideas between its constituents.
Courts have granted full protection even to speech of an
obviously minority viewpoint on the political spectrum.37 The speech
of the minority is especially deserving of protection because otherwise
it will not be articulated or even considered by majoritarian
legislatures. The First Amendment is the only hope for those who
wish to espouse radical ideas.
The Court also has granted nonpolitical speech First
Amendment protection. 38 This category includes such forms of expres-
sion as literature and art, although people increasingly have used
these modes to express political themes3 The Court considers speech
that expresses some view of the nature of society to be closely akin to
accepted in the competition of the market, and that the truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out." Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978). The predominantly Jewish town of
Skokie obtained an injunction preventing the National Socialist Party from parading in uniform,
displaying the swastika, and distributing leaflets that promote racial hatred and violence. The
Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction, albeit "with extreme regret." Id. at 1210.
34. See Blasi, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. at 549-50 (cited in note 17) (citing diversity of
opinion as a core aim of the First Amendment).
35. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989).
36. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing
the Framers' goal in amending the Constitution). See Gunther, Constitutional Law at 997-98
(cited in note 3) (analyzing the intent of the First Amendment).
37. See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1203 (upholding rights of Nazi supporters to march in a
predominantly Jewish neighborhood).
38. See generally Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 3.01 (cited in note 3) (discussing
the Court's treatment of nonpolitical speech).
39. Marjorie Heins, Sex, Sin and Blasphemy 6 (New Press, 1993) (discussing the purpose
and scope of artistic freedom). See notes 108-09 and accompanying text (concerning the use of art
by those in the homosexual community).
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the political warrants of First Amendment protection: 40 "[O]ur cases
have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social,
artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters.., is not entitled to full
First Amendment protection."
41
In addition, this type of speech often invokes the First
Amendment's guarantee of liberty and self-fulfillment. The free ex-
change of ideas as a means of seeking truth and a democratic consen-
sus is not the only purpose of the First Amendment. Individual self-
realization and self-autonomy are equally important, if less tangible,
goals. Self-realization is the process of defining and expressing one-
self. Self-autonomy entails the community respecting individuals as
equal, rational, and autonomous beings.42 Individuals gain respect for
their community in the same way.
The Court has granted First Amendment protection even to
speech that operates only on a commercial level, such as advertising.
43
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Counsel,44 the Counsel challenged a state statute prohibiting the
advertising of prescription drug prices. A consumer organization
claimed that the First Amendment entitled buyers to information
about drug prices. The board of pharmacists argued that because the
advertising in question did not seek to espouse any political or social
views, the Court should deny it First Amendment protection. The
Court responded that the economic nature of speech will not remove it
from the umbrella of the First Amendment.45 The free flow of
commercial information is of greater public interest than many
political debates." The Court consequently held that the First
Amendment demands free access to information, in spite of the state's
admittedly strong interests in consumer health and professional
40. It is often difficult to differentiate between political speech and that speech which is
purely social. The Court consequently offers protection to much speech that exhibits only
marginal political value. See, for example, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,
331 (7th Cir. 1985); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 763-65 (1976).
41. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1976). See also Hudnut, 771 F.2d at
329-30 (suggesting that the proven power of pornography to affect the socialization of its viewers
merely exhibits the power of its message).
42. Baker, 25 UCLA L. Rev. at 991 (cited in note 3). In fact, Professor Baker argues that
the primary goal of the First Amendment is to ensure freedom from government restriction on
self-realization and self-autonomy. Id.
43. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (granting First Amendment protection to
advertisements); Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the sale of items emblazoned with a message is accorded First Amendment
protection).
44. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
45. Id. at 761.
46. Id. at 763.
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expertise.47 In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed its broad
protection of all speech, including that of an economic nature.48
3. Freedom of Association
Even beyond the pure expression of viewpoints, the Court has
interpreted the First Amendment to include broad protection for the
right to associate for the purpose of engaging in expression.49 The
Court considers this protection necessary to encourage political action
because different groups can attain success only by expressing their
opinions.50 Individuals must be able to form effective opinion blocs in
order to participate in a democratic system. This freedom is an impor-
tant corollary to the right to free speech. Without the freedom to
associate, individuals cannot organize into politically effective groups
or achieve self-fulfillment as a society. The Court, however, has
carefully distinguished between the privacy right to pure association
and the speech right to expressive association.5 1 The right to intimate
association flows from the right to privacy.52 Expressive association,
47. Id. at 770.
48. See, for example, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (extending
First Amendment protection to advertising for legal services); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432
(1978) (requiring exacting scrutiny of any restriction on advertising that contains political
content). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (upholding restric-
tions on advertising that are motivated by a compelling state interest).
Although the Court ensures First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the degree of
protection often has slipped to "intermediate scrutiny." Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). Some scholars have argued that commercial speech is
irrelevant to the representative government and individual self-fulfillment rationales of the First
Amendment. See Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffl'ies, Jr., Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1979) (arguing that the
First Amendment should not protect commercial speech from government regulation).
49. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Court stated: "[I]t is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious
or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to
associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." Id. at 460-61. See also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 523 (1960) (overturning convictions for refusal to furnish NAACP membership lists to city
authorities as violative of the freedom of association); Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 (finding compelled
membership in a union to violate freedoms of association and speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963) (invalidating under the First Amendment a state statute prohibiting
solicitation of lawyers by intermediaries acting on behalf of an organization).
50. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-26 at 1013-15 (cited in note 18) (discussing
the modern conception of the freedom of assembly).
51. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (finding no infring-
ment on a civic association's freedom of intimate association or freedom of expressive association
by a state's anti-gender discrimination law); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1987) (rejecting a claim that the society's policy of excluding women
is protected by either intimate or expressive association rights).
52. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (affirming a fundamental right to privacy).
But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-01 (1986) (denying a privacy right to engage in
sodomy).
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on the other hand, is the grouping of individuals for the purpose of
advocating a particular belief.5
In Bates v. City of Little Rock, 54 members of the NAACP chal-
lenged city ordinances requiring disclosure of membership lists to
government officials. 55 They argued that providing the lists would
subject members to harassment and threats.5 The Court invalidated
the ordinances, affirming the First Amendment right of citizens to
assemble "for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances .... 57
Thus, courts grant additional protection to activities under the First
Amendment when people join together for-the purpose of expression.
4. Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech
The right to speech also protects expression from those laws
that only incidentally impinge on this right. Some laws, with other-
wise valid objectives, unwittingly infringe on speech.8 For example,
in Schneider v. State59 the Court invalidated laws prohibiting the
posting of signs and the distribution of leaflets to prevent litter be-
cause the laws denied the expressive rights of those seeking to propa-
gate their ideas in this manner.60 These cases often pose particular
difficulty for courts because almost every regulation may restrict
speech on some level,61 yet the freedom of speech must not preempt
government's ability to pass laws concerning society's conduct
efficiently.
The O'Brien test, which balances the government's non-speech
interests in certain activities against the corresponding interests of
those challenging the laws, has helped to solve these dilemmas. In
53. This concept is best recognized in the protection of political demonstrations. See
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-08 (1982) (recognizing the protected
elements of expressive association in an organized boycott of merchants).
54. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
55. Id. at 521-22.
56. Id. at 522.
57. Id. at 522-23. See also Gunther, Constitutional Law at 1408-09 (cited in note 3)
(discussing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)).
58. See, for example, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (challenging
zoning ordinances that restrict the location of adult movie theaters); Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (same).
59. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
60. Id. at 163.
61. For example, in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), companies that
owned and rented billboard spaces challenged a city ordinance that restricted many forms of
outdoor advertising to prevent visual pollution. Id. at 493-97. Although the regulation appeared
content.neutral, the Court held that the law's list of content-specific exceptions violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 513.
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United States v. O'Brien,62 four men challenged their convictions for
knowingly burning their draft cards. 3 They argued that although
their conduct was illegal, the First Amendment protected the symbolic
speech involved in their activity. 64 The Court held that a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating non-speech activities
may justify an incidental limitation of First Amendment protection. 5
The Court subsequently refined its method of balancing.66 The
current test weighs the content-neutral goals of the government's
infringements against the limited speech interests and considers
whether any reasonable alternatives are available to either party.67 If
the court determines that the infringement on speech is content-
based, it is deemed per se invalid.68 The O'Brien balancing exhibits
the power of the First Amendment's proscription of all infringements
on speech. Courts will review even incidental infringements carefully
for any constitutional infirmity.
5. Protecting Homosexual Speech
The speech of homosexual individuals and groups provides an
example of expression that should fall squarely within the protection
provided by the First Amendment. They are a social minority whose
views are particularly susceptible to suppression because of the poten-
62. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
63. Id. at 369-70.
64. Id. at 376. The Court noted that not all conduct may be labeled "speech" but did not
base its decision on this aspect of the case. Id.
65. The Court stated: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
66. See Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-11 (1969) (finding a
school's prohibition of black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War to violate the First
Amendment).
67. For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1983), the
Court stated: "We have often noted that [content-neutral] restrictions are valid provided that
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information." Id. at 293. See generally Nimmer, Nimmer on
Freedom of Speech § 2.06 (cited in note 3).
68. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring that the government
interest be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"). See Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom
of Speech § 2.06[A][3] at 2-88 (cited in note 3) (discussing the requirement of content neutrality).
But see John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale
L. J. 1205, 1327-28 (1970) (examining the impurity of legislative incentives and the mixed-motive
problem).
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tial hazards of expressing their views.6 9 To combat this social dis-
crimination, the judicial system must ensure the constitutional rights
of homosexual men and women. In the realm of political and social
speech, some courts have sought to ensure gay men and lesbians the
freedom of expression accorded to all American citizens by the First
Amendment.
In Fricke v. Lynch,70 Aaron Fricke sought the right to attend
his high school's prom with a male escort. The school argued that
Fricke's attendance was not the type of speech the First Amendment
was intended to protect.71 Alternatively, the school argued that even if
Fricke's attendance was protected expression, the interest in prevent-
ing violence was sufficient to deny Fricke's right.12 The court ruled,
however, that the First Amendment demanded that Fricke and his
date be admitted.73 After noting the expressive qualities of Fricke's
actions, 74 the court held that attending a prom could be considered
political in certain instances.75
The First Amendment guarantees the right to speak on politi-
cal and social issues. The equal protection function of the First
Amendment76 prevents any regulations impinging on free expression
from discriminating on the basis of content.7 When homosexual ex-
69. Attacks on gays and lesbians have been increasing at an alarming rate in recent years,
in terms of frequency and viciousness. See, for example, Nat Hentoff, A Case of Loathing: Gay-
Bashing Is Out of the Closet. Again., 38 Playboy 94 (May 1991); Susan M. Barbieri, Gay-Bashing:
The Hate, Fear; Attacks on Gays Increasing, Orlando Sentinel Tribune El (Mar. 31, 1993).
According to Martin Hiraga, director of the anti-violence project for the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force: "The continuing rise [in violence against homosexual men and women],
particularly in cities with long-established victims' services, indicates to us it [results from] not
just increasing awareness, but increasing incidence of hate violence." Arlene Levinson, Threat of
Violence Other Longtime Companion for Gay Men, Women, L.A. Times A8 (July 18, 1993).
70. 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.L 1980).
71. Id. at 384-85.
72. Id. at 383-84. This was an attempt to frame Fricke's action in O'Brien terms as an
incidental restriction, but this restriction was intentional.
73. Id. at 388.
74. The proposed activity has expressive content: "Aaron testified that he wants to go [to
the prom] because he feels he has a right to attend and participate just like all the other students
and that it would be dishonest to his own sexual identity to take a girl to the dance.... [ie feels
his attendance would have a certain political element and would be a statement for equal rights
and human rights." Id. at 384-85. Although Fricke is hailed as a victory for gay rights, it is
important to note the specific type of expression involved. Aaron wished to attend the prom "just
like all the other students." Id. at 385. An alternative reading of Fricke suggests that homosexual
expression portraying a message of assimilation of the wider heterosexual culture often is granted
recognition, while that which runs counter to society's beliefs is devalued.
75. Id. at 384-85.
76. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972) (finding no appropriate
government interest to be furthered by an ordinance that differentiated between labor pickets
and other peaceful demonstrations).
77. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (finding an equal protection violation in a
statute's differentiation between demonstrations at a personal dwelling and labor picketing).
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pression unquestionably falls in the category of political or social
speech, most courts protect it from state-imposed restrictions.78  The
equality of these protections breaks down, however, when expression
strays from the majoritarian path of civil discourse.79
B. Limits on Speech
Despite the seemingly boundless protection of the First
Amendment, some speech must be excluded. In an ordered society,
not all speech rationally may receive the absolute protection of the
First Amendment. The need for effective regulation of society must
temper the importance of free speech in some instances. The cich6
about shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater remains a part of First
Amendment law. The O'Brien balancing test permits some content-
neutrals° infringements on speech. Courts also have recognized other
content-based exclusions.81
1. Limits on Expression
Content-based exclusions stem from the belief that although
the First Amendment is near the top of the hierarchy of rights in the
system of government, certain other values must prevail even over
free speech. 2  These exclusions fall into two general categories: (1)
78. Gay Activists Alliance v. WMATA, No. 78-2217, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1404, 1408
(D.D.C. July 5, 1979) (requiring a subway to sell advertising space for a poster stating 'Someone
in Your Life is Gay"); Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found.,
417 F. Supp. 632, 639 (D.R.I. 1976) (allowing a homosexual group to participate in state-sponsored
festivities).
79. Part of the argument in this Note is that First Amendment equality for homosexual
expression may require that standards of judging homosexual speech differ from those used to
judge the expression of heterosexuals. This concept does not posit additional protection for
homosexual speakers; this reverse discrimination would destroy the free market of ideas
embodied in the First Amendment. Instead, a subjective view of the value of expression to the
individual speaker would recognize the multiplicity of beliefs and modes of expression in our
society. A subjective evaluation of expression may impact First Amendment theory most directly
in the area of the O'Brien analysis. See Part IV.B.
The law has begun to recognize difference theory in other areas. See Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (asserting a "reasonable victim" standard in a Title
VII claim). See also Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
Feminism Unmodified 32, 33 (Harvard U., 1987); Constance Penley, The Future of an Illusion xii-
xiv (U. of Minnesota, 1989).
80. State legislatures consequently may disguise intentional infringements as content-
neutral ones.
81. For example, the Court excludes obscenity on the basis of its content. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). See Part III.A for a discussion of content-based exclusions.
82. See generally Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 2.01 (cited in note 3) (discussing
the absolutist position and highlighting its flaws).
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those based on objective tests and (2) those excluded by categoriza-
tion.83
The first category of exclusions poses fewer problems of inter-
pretation than the second. This exclusion most often is witnessed in
the application of the "clear and present danger test" to speech having
the potential to incite illegal conduct84 The Court justifies its denial
of First Amendment protection to inciteful speech on the ground that
some speakers intentionally disrupt the marketplace of ideas by
compelling listeners to commit actions of civil unrest. The classic
theory of the First Amendment touts a rational discourse of ideas.
Speech that may appeal to the emotional, irrational desires of
listeners is contrary to the civil discourse model.85 The possibility of
over-regulation and self-censorship is minimized by the strict limits on
the exclusion of this speech from protection.
The second, and far broader, category of exclusions offers no
specific test. 6 The belief that some speech adds nothing to and actu-
ally may frustrate the marketplace also justifies these exclusions. 8'
These exclusions rely on purely definitional determinations by the
courts.88 The potential for abuse is high, and the specter of over-regu-
lation and self-censorship thus returns.
2. Dangers Inherent in These Limits
Definitional exclusions are particularly susceptible to the
majoritarian influences of society. Because they are based on the
belief that some speech is not truly expressive, but only conduct or
83. See Gunther, Constitutional Law at 1006-07 (cited in note 3).
84. As demonstrated by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio: "[T]he constitutional guaran-
tees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
85. See Bork, 47 Ind. L. J. at 31 (cited in note 17) (stating that "[a]dvocacy of law violation is
a call to set aside the results that political speech has produced').
86. Foremost among these are the exclusion of obscenity and "fighting words" from the
protection of the First Amendment.
87. See, for example, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir.
1985) (noting the power of beliefs and images to affect and control the subconscious).
88. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), remains the seminal example of this
definitional exclusion:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting"
words.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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thoughts unworthy of protection, speech on the fringes of acceptability
is that most often excluded. This unworthiness is based on the
reasonableness of the speech as defined by the courts. Consequently,
once the presumption that judges are apolitical, socially neutral, and
not susceptible to any constructed viewpoint is overcome, the precari-
ous position of this speech becomes apparent.89 Because of inherent
biases, any definition of Reason is suspect, yet also irrefutable.
This arbitrary line between the protected speech of Reason and
the excluded expression of Unreason has produced particularly trou-
blesome results in recent years. For example, when courts seek to
identify the speech interests of those who dance,90 or simply live,91 in
the nude, judges' inherent biases necessarily influence their determi-
nation of what is a reasonable and rational means of expression. As
demonstrated by the disparate outcomes of these cases, protection
depends on the trier of law's perspective.9 2 This is the true danger
posed by definitional exclusions from protection-they rely on the
majoritarian-constructed beliefs of courts to identify and weigh the
counter-majoritarian concepts of speakers properly.
III. DANGERS TO ExPRESSION POSED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The current interpretation of the First Amendment offers
unswerving protection to some judicially recognized forms and con-
tents of expression. Because of the inherent beliefs and concepts of
the judges, however, who apply First Amendment doctrine to ambigu-
ous fact patterns, the freedom of speech often is perverted to deny
protection to the very groups it is intended to protect. Individuals and
groups advocating non-majoritarian beliefs do not receive complete
protection. Judges, and the courts they comprise, interpret the ex-
pression of others through a filter of what they themselves consider to
be reasonable contributions to the marketplace of ideas; therefore,
89. See Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Roadblock, 5 Civ.
Liberties Rev. 19 (Jan.-Feb. 1979).
90. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
91. South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608 (11th Cir. 1984).
92. In refusing to accept the articles of incorporation proposed by the Greater Cincinnati
Gay Society, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that "[a]lthough homosexual acts between consent-
ing adults are no longer statutory offenses. . . the promotion of homosexuality as a valid lifestyle
is contrary to the public policy of the state." State ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313
N.E.2d 847, 848 (1974).
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they often are blind to expression that is contrary to the rational
norms of society.93
In valuing other systems of sexual mores, courts should use
particular caution and an extremely broad notion of acceptability.
Courts, however, have particular difficulty in recognizing the expres-
sive values in other forms of sexual orientation.9 4 Consequently, the
current interpretation of the First Amendment often fails to protect
many "others,"95 foremost among these individuals who are homo-
sexuals.
A broad view of First Amendment expression is particularly
important for gay men and lesbian women.96 Homosexual speakers
have a heightened need for truly free expression because of the isola-
tion that society has forced on them and the instrumental role speech
plays in defining the lives of this "invisible minority."97 Homosexual
expression consistently is demeaned by the current interpretation of
the First Amendment because of the inability of majoritarian courts to
comprehend and accord value to the expressive qualities of homosex-
ual interaction.9 8
93. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Protection of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L. J. 799, 804-05, 820-25 (1979). See FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (allowing regulation of comedic satire because of its offensive
content). See generally Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99
Yale L. J. 1359, 1375-78 (1990) (suggesting that any judicial attempt to differentiate between
expression that possesses "serious artistic value" and that which does not invariably will
undervalue much art).
94. See McLaughlin v, Bd. of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353,
358 (1973) (upholding the revocation of the license of a physician who engaged in public
homosexual conduct); Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ. of Montomery County, 491 F.2d 498, 503-04 (4th
Cir. 1974) (upholding the transfer of a teacher to administrative duties because he withheld
information about his gay activism from his application); Gaylor v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 88
Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, 1343-46 (1972) (upholding the discharge of a teacher on charges of
immorality and known homosexuality); Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 252-54
(9th Cir. 1976) (upholding removal of an employee for 'flaunting" his homosexuality).
95. The concept of "the other" refers to the tendency to define unreasonableness in terms of
what is different from ourselves. See Karst, 1990 U. l. L. Rev. at 109-11 (cited in note 9).
96. Paul Siegal, Lesbian and Gay Rights as a Free Speech Issue: A Review of Relevant
Caselaw, 21 J. Homosexuality 203,204 (1983).
97. Id.
98. See, for example, City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497
N.Y.S.2d 979, 982-83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (upholding a city's injunction to close baths because of a
fear about the spread of AIDS); MP. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256, 1259, 1263 (1979)
(allowing a lesbian mother to retain custody of her child because evidence showed no involvement
in any homosexual organization); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1974)
(upholding a state's refusal to sanction same-sex marriages).
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A. Devaluing Speech Because of Its Content
1. Obscenity
One of the most common forms of public expression employed
by homosexual men and women is art. Art is a medium often used to
criticize and reform society. Art and literature have become modes of
expression for outsiders. Yet the courts often deny First Amendment
protection to artists who address homosexual issues.99
This loss of protection results from the exclusion of obscene
material from the First Amendment's definition of expression.'00 The
Court denies First Amendment protection to speech it considers
obscene because that speech contributes nothing of value to the mar-
ketplace of ideas.101 In fact, obscene material is considered doubly
antithetical because it actively frustrates the civil exchange of ideas
by appealing directly to biological urges and undermining rational
discourse .
0 2
In Miller v. California,' °3 the Court articulated the current test
for determining whether speech should be excluded from First
Amendment protection as obscenity. The appellant challenged his
conviction under California's criminal obscenity statute for conducting
a mass mailing of materials depicting adults engaged in explicit sex-
ual activity.'0 4 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its exclusion of obscene
material from First Amendment protection. 05 The Court noted five
elements that, if fulfilled, may remove speech from the protection of
the First Amendment and abandon it to the regulation of state laws:1°6
(1) it is a description or depiction of sexual conduct; (2) it is conduct
that is "patently offensive;" (3) there is a specific prohibition in state
99. See, for example, Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1966) (affirming a
conviction for distribution of obscene books emphasizing homosexual acts); Pope v. Illinois, 481
U.S. 497, 501, 504 (1987) (remanding People v. Pope, 138 IlM. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985),
and adopting a "reasonable person" standard of review in considering the literary value of a work,
but sustaining the conviction for selling obscene literature); In re Pacifica Found., 2 FCCRcd.
2698, 2700-01 (1987) (finding excerpts of an AIDS-related drama broadcast over radio to violate
the prohibition against indecency, and opining that these excerpts also constitute obscenity).
100. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483
(1957).
101. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-7,2 (1942).
102. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L. J. 589, 617.
103. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
104. Id. at 16.
105. The Court stated: 'To equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate
with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First
Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom." Id. at 34.
106. Id. at 25-26.
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law; (4) it is appealing to the prurient interest, as defined by
contemporary community standards; and (5) it is lacking in "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
0 7
Homosexual art involves themes that are particular to the
genre. Almost by definition, it will portray same-sex love and suggest
homoerotic sex acts that may disturb the typical viewer.yu8 The ele-
ments common to homoerotic art closely parallel the criteria that
define obscenity under the First Amendment. The only element that
may save homoerotic art from the obscenity exclusion is a
determination of its artistic value. 1°9
2. Fighting Words
The fighting words exclusion provides another danger to the
speech of homosexual citizens. Courts may abuse the fighting words
exclusion to deny First Amendment protection to homosexual expres-
sion. When a homosexual man expresses or flaunts his status, he may
face the hatred and violence of others. "Coming out" involves more
than just confiding one's sexual preference to others; it often includes
living an openly gay lifestyle. The open expression of homosexuality
in a predominantly heterosexual community may result in fear and
anger. Homosexual men and women may experience retaliation from
neighbors who resent this invasion of their world by "queers."l °
Unfortunately, confrontation and violence all too often are the re-
sult."' The fighting words exclusion poses the potential danger that
individuals perceived by the courts as flaunting their sexuality'12 will
107. Id. The Court specifically did not embrace the "utterly without redeeming social value"
standard adopted in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). See Miller, 413 U.S. at
24-25.
108. Some theorists claim that homosexual art need not portray sex acts and that homo-
sexuality is defined by viewpoint and status rather than specific acts of sex. See Anne B.
Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants
of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L. J. 1073, 1079-91 (1988). Because homosexuality is the
'invisible minority," however, it is defined by the majority of the population in terms of sex.
Those seeking to address a mass audience must reciprocate by expressing many messages on the
same terms.
109. See Adler, Note, 99 Yale L. J. at 1375-78 (cited in note 93) (concerning the fallacies of
any such determination).
110. Although this term was once used derogatorily, the homosexual community has
recaptured it. See generally Michelangelo Signorile, Queer in America: Sex the Media, and the
Closets of Power (Random House, 1993).
111. See Barbieri, Orlando Sentinel Tribune at El (cited in note 69) (discussing increasing
levels of violence and victimization in major metropolitan areas).
112, "Flaunting" implies a value judgment of rationality or irrationality itself.
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be disciplined for their expression. It may be argued that by their
expression, they are inciting others to violence."1
Some courts also abuse the fighting words exclusion to allow
the "heckler's veto" to remain a part of First Amendment jurispru-
dence." 4 The heckler's veto perverts the fighting words exclusion by
denying protection on the theory that expression may so incense
listeners that they will harm the speaker. Although few other courts
have accepted this argument, the concept has yet to be laid to rest
definitively." 5 The continued existence of this exclusion, and its appli-
cation to deny homosexual speech, exhibits courts' inability to recog-
nize this type of expression as worthy of First Amendment protection.
3. Low-Value Speech
Another method by which courts consistently deny First
Amendment protection to homosexual speech is by classifying it as
"low-value" speech. Justice Stevens promoted this concept in Young v.
American Mini Theatres"6 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation."17  In
Young, he noted that a Detroit ordinance excluding adult theaters and
bookstores from specific zones within the city was a content-based
restriction, and not an issue for the content-neutral O'Brien analy-
sis.118 Instead of invalidating the ordinance, Justice Stevens wrote
that the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods
was sufficient justification to restrict this type of speech." 9 Without
articulating any objective standards, the Court allowed restrictions on
the content of some speech on the recitation of a relatively minimal
governmental interest based on the perceived value of that content.120
Identifying low-value speech is particularly troublesome be-
cause the social construct of the listener defines the value. The dis-
course of homosexuals relies on value judgments and base tenets
dissimilar to those of heterosexuals; therefore, what is considered of
113. But see S. Adele Shank, Sticks and Stones: Homosexual Solicitations and the Fighting
Words Doctrine, 41 Ohio St. L. J. 553, 573 (1980) (suggesting that the frequency of homosexual
activity in society refutes any argument that the average person would be incited to violence).
114. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), which upheld regulation of speech because of a
hostile audience, has yet to be definitively reversed.
115. See State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128, 1134 (1979) (allowing the
"heckler's veto" to deny gay speech); Solmitz v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 495 A.2d 812, 818 (Me.
1985) (upholding a school's right to cancel "Tolerance Day" because of fear of violent protest).
116. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
117. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
118. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. See Part II.A.4 (concerning the balancing test for incidental
restrictions on speech).
119. Young, 427 U.S. at 71-73.
120. See id. at 70.
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low value by one group may be common and necessary to the other.
For example, within the homosexual community, explicit intimations
to sexual activity may be considered acceptable, even common in some
situations, and certainly not of low value.121 Within heterosexual
dialogue, however, this speech may be defined simply as sexual har-
assment, or unreasonable and unworthy of the First Amendment's
protection.' 2  Consequently, despite its homosexual context, courts
refuse this speech the First Amendment's protection.
B. Devaluing Speech Because of Its Mode of Expression
Majoritarian nonrecognition of homosexual expression's value
also is exhibited by the distinction between the protection of true
expression and that of conduct. It generally is accepted that conduct
may be expressive. The protection of the First Amendment extends
beyond pure speech to encompass other forms of expression.'2 3
However, those seeking to restrict speech often label the expression of
others as conduct unprotected by the Constitution.124
1. Symbolic Speech
By defining some expression as mere conduct, majoritarian
influences may deny adequate protection to much of the homosexual
community's expression. Conduct emulating the expression of the
straight world and attempting to assimilate gay men and lesbians into
acceptable, reasoned speech patterns receives First Amendment
121. See, for example, McLaughlin v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111
Cal. Rptr. 353, 355-56 (1973) (describing a solicitation scene); Pacifica, 2 FCCRcd. at 2700
(transcribing a fictional homosexual encounter in a drama).
122. The following description of a gay bar in an undercover investigator's testimony exhibits
the alien nature of homosexual expression for many heterosexuals:
They were conversing and some of them in a lisping tone of voice, and during certain
parts of their conversations they used limp-wrist movements to each other. One man
would stick his tongue out at another and they would laugh and they would giggle. They
were very, very chummy and close. When they drank their drinks, they extended their
pinkies in a very dainty manner. They took short sips from their straws; [it] took them
quite a long time to finish their drinks.
One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 50 N.J. 329, 235 A.2d
12, 15 (1967).
123. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (holding that burning the United States
flag is expression protected by the First Amendment, if not speech in the absolute sense). But see
Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1284, 1297-99 (1983) (arguing
against the inclusion of expressive conduct under the First Amendment's protection).
124. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (wearing a
jacket emblazoned with an offensive message); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting) (burning the United States flag).
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protection.12 5 Because the homosexual community often seeks to
remain silent about its defining characteristic, however, much
homosexual activity takes the form of conduct.11-6  For example, the
wearing of a particular hairstyle or piece of clothing may signal to
other members of this invisible minority that the speaker is gay. 27
Theoretically, this selective disclosure implies to the receiver of the
message that he is not alone.128 This overt conduct expresses a mes-
sage of silent unity and consequently should fall squarely within the
protection of the First Amendment.129
Similar conduct by a member of the straight world, however, is
not expressive; it is only conduct.'-o This dichotomy holds the seed of
devaluation. When the straight world faces conduct that is considered
expressive by homosexual actors, it often is unable or unwilling to
accept the expressive elements within this conduct. 3' Consequently,
heterosexual judges may fail to recognize the expressive elements in
homosexual conduct.
2. Status
The distinction between expression and status mirrors the
distinction between expression and conduct.32 In differentiating
between the expression of beliefs and status, the courts refuse First
Amendment protection to speech that exemplifies homosexuality.
This dichotomy fails to recognize the expression of status itself as
protected speech. The cases challenging this dichotomy almost in-
125. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text (concerning Aaron Fricke).
126. Indeed, even when silence is not at issue, the one characteristic that differentiates
homosexuals from the straight world is conduct. Thus, much homosexual conduct may be viewed
as political and social dissent. See note 1 and accompanying text.
127. Michael H. Hodges, We Are Every Wear, Gannett News Service (Apr. 25, 1993)
(available in LEXIS, NEWS library, GNS file) (discussing the gay culture's styles and symbols).
128. See Siegal, 21 J. Homosexuality at 241 (cited in note 96).
129. For an interesting parallel, see Paul D. Murphy, Restricting Gang Clothing in Public
Schools: Does a Dress Code Violate a Student's Right to Free Expression?, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1321,
1360-61 (1991) (suggesting that schools may regulate students' dress in the name of safety).
130. See Jarman v. Williams, 753 F.2d 76, 77-78 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that student
dancing is not protected by the First Amendment because it does not carry any message).
131. National Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1984)
(invalidating a statute that provided for dismissal of teachers engaging in any homosexual
conduct); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 367 F. Supp. 1088, 1091-93 (D.N.H. 1974) (requiring a uni-
versity to recognize officially both educational and social activities of a gay student group).
Although both of these cases resulted in protection of the homosexual conduct involved, they
exhibit the potential for abuse of the expression-conduct distinction. See also Laurie Magid, First
Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 467, 475-76 (1984) (analyzing
what type of expressive conduct may receive First Amendment protection).
132. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 966-67 (1989).
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variably involve the removal of homosexual men and women from
military service.133 When a member of the armed forces chooses or is
forced to come out, she faces discharge on the grounds of her status as
a homosexual. 3 4 When confronted with the argument that the speech
involved in coming out is protected by the First Amendment, courts
usually agree that action against an individual on the basis of speech
alone would be unconstitutional. 3 5  Courts always uphold these dis-
charges, however, on the grounds that they are the result of the ho-
mosexual's status qua homosexual.13 6
This result fails to recognize that for a member of the invisible
minority, expression is by its very nature a required element of
status.3 7 Only by some expression of beliefs may homosexual status
be identified. By upholding discharge based on homosexual status,
courts deny First Amendment protection to expression. A false di-
chotomy has been erected between speech and status as a result of the
inability to recognize certain speech as that which reasonably may be
made by a member of the military.
3. Association
In order to coalesce as a community and break the tradition of
silence that has contributed to their subordination, homosexual men
and women must express their orientation. This goal also is fulfilled
by the gathering of gay men and lesbians.18 These gatherings do not
always fit the straight model of a political rally. Those gatherings
that do fit the model receive First Amendment protection even though
they may have different purposes.'3 9
Before they can achieve political recognition, homosexual men
and women first must defy their isolation and begin to form liaisons
with others similarly situated. For many years, the gay bar and the
133. See, for example, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that
Army regulations against homosexual members do not violate the First Amendment because the
rules address status rather than speech).
134. Even under the current policy of "don't ask, don't tell," this punishment remains in
force.
135. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 460, 462.
136. Id. at 462.
137. Those who are silently homosexual without ever exposing their status to the world may
constitute one exception to this statement. Requiring people who are homosexual to remain in
this state is tantamount to denying their existence and demanding assimilation.
138. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics at 57-58, 114-15, 148 (cited in note 15).
139. See Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267,
1272 (M.D. Tenn. 1979) (confirming a gay student organization's right to university recognition
and benefits to which other student organizations are entitled).
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bathhouse have provided this type of centralized forum. 40 Since the
1950s, however, these pseudo-political gatherings have faced intense
attacks from the straight government and police force.14' Although
political pressure has halted many police raids, attempts to prevent
the harassment in court have had only marginal success.14 These
legal losses resulted in part from the Court's refusal to grant
associational privacy rights to the gatherings of homosexual men and
women. Privacy is a protected right under the Constitution.'4 To
receive this protection, however, certain requirements of selectivity
and intimacy must be met. The gay bar or bathhouse is unable to
fulfill these criteria.'H
The true value of these gathering places to the homosexual
community is not based on their associational privacy aspects, but on
their expressive potential. The First Amendment protects expressive
association. 145 To achieve complete expression, people must be free to
gather for this purpose. Yet, the legal system has been unable to
accept homosexual gatherings as more than simple association; there-
fore, the courts consider the gatherings unrelated to expression.'4 To
fulfill the goals of the First Amendment, courts must recognize the
expressive association of homosexual groups as valid on its own terms
rather than the pigeonhole perspectives of the majority.
4. Content-Neutral Expression
All of the preceding examples of the devaluation of speech
intermingle in the context of content-neutral restrictions on speech. 1 7
Restrictions that may infringe incidentally on expression pose particu-
lar danger to marginalized groups. Majoritarian legislatures often
140. See Bruce Mailman, The Battle for Safe Sex in the Baths, N.Y. Times A31 (Dec. 5, 1985)
(discussing the need for gay bathhouses as a "safe haven" for assembly of gay men).
141. See D'Emilio, Sexual Politics at 231-39 (cited in note 15); Marvin Liebman, Stonewall
Revisited. Witnesses to the Birth of the Gay Revolution, Wash. Post D2 (May 24, 1993) (discussing
the three-day riot in New York in 1969 in response to police harassment).
142. See City of New York v. New Saint Mark's Baths, 130 Misc. 2d 911, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979,
983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (rejecting freedom of association claims of members); Freeman v. Hittle,
747 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring a church-affiliated club with gay clientele to
provide membership lists to the state).
143. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
144. See New Saint Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 982-83 (refusing to extend privacy rights
to a commercial venture).
145. See Part II.A.3.
146. See New Saint Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
147. See Part ll.A.4.
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enact but do not recognize, or choose to disregard, the results of these
laws. 48 This ignorance replicates the subordination of the past.
49
When courts review First Amendment challenges to these
"accidental" restrictions on speech, they apply the O'Brien method of
balancing the interests of the government against the interests of the
speaker. Yet, courts often undervalue the speech interests of homo-
sexual men and women in this equation, not recognizing the expres-
sive value inherent in another culture. In Singer v. United States
Civil Service Commission,15 the plaintiff challenged a decision to
terminate his employment because of his "flaunting and advocacy of a
controversial lifestyle." 15' In addressing Singer's First Amendment
claim, the court noted the government's interest in avoiding "public
contempt"' 152 and held that "promoting the efficiency of the public
service"153 outweighed Singer's interest in exercising his First
Amendment rights.'6 Significantly, at no point in its opinion did the
court actually discuss Singer's interest.55
Although the dangers of nonrecognition and devaluation by the
courts are strong, these concerns are even more resonant in expressly
majoritarian legislatures. The expression of the homosexual commu-
nity, or any other minority, will suffer under these circumstances.
Instead of protecting fringe speech, courts often may consider a rela-
tively low-value government interest sufficient to overcome important
homosexual speech rights.'5
148. Note that intentional restrictions on particular content are per se invalid. But see
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (allowing content-based restrictions on
'low-value" speech).
149. In response, Laurence Tribe proposed that homosexual men and women should be
recognized as a suspect class. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-33 at 1616 (cited in note
18).
150. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976).
151. Id. at 251. An investigator from the Commission noted several instances, including
embracing a man in front of his prior place of employment, indicating by his clothing that he
intended to remain homosexual, seeking to obtain a marriage license with another man, organiz-
ing a symposium on gay issues in Seattle, and displaying homosexual messages on his automobile.
Id. at 249.
152. Id. at 254.
153. Id. at 256 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
154. Singer, 530 F.2d at 256.
155. Seeid.at251.
156. A particularly disturbing development in this area has been the push by Justice Scalia
to eliminate entirely First Amendment protection for expression that is limited by content-neutral
restrictions. As Justice Scalia views it, these limitations on expression, if truly content-neutral,
should be upheld as valid exercises of legislative prerogative. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538, 2546-47 (1992).
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5. Right to Silence
A final area in which the current narrow interpretation of
expression may undermine the First Amendment involves the right
not to speak.157 Just as the First Amendment guarantees all people
the right to express beliefs before the public, it also protects the right
to keep those views private.15 This element of the First Amendment
is particularly meaningful to the homosexual community, some of
whose members may wish to retain their status as closet gays and
lesbians. 159
The Court's current view of First Amendment reasonableness
may seriously threaten the homosexual community's right to silence.
The registration of sex offenders by the police is one such infringe-
ment.16 0 Although forced registration serves goals of community wel-
fare and helps identify repeat offenders,161 it also trammels the rights
of gay men and lesbians who live in states in which sodomy is a crime
to be secure in their private sexual identities. The government's non-
speech goals in registering those who violate sodomy laws with
consenting partners may seem minimal to some; however, the Court
may consider the interests in maintaining silence insufficient to
counterbalance the government's aims. 162  The true value of
anonymity to homosexual men and women cannot be measured by the
standards of the straight world. The Court must measure the
interests of the homosexual community subjectively.
The recent trend of "forced outing" of homosexual men and
women also threatens the First Amendment's guarantee of silence.' 63
157. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (holding that teachers
cannot be compelled to contribute to a union that expresses ideas they do not support).
158. See Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.10[B] at 4-144 (cited in note 3)
(discussing the general protection of this right, but noting specific instances in which it has been
abridged).
159. In fact, the concept of keeping one's status a secret to the world may involve certain po-
litical elements because it implies criticism and mistrust of the current social norms and the
reaction to counter-majoritarian views. In addition, the right to anonymity also allows the
formation of potentially expressive associations without fear of government reprisals.
160. See, for example, Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-6-110 (1991), which states:
(a) The Tennessee bureau of investigation shall establish a central registry of sex-
ual offenders modeled after statutes enacted in other states. The registry shall include all
validated offenders from files maintained by the department of human services, all per-
sons who have been arrested for the commission of a sexual offense, and all persons who
have been convicted of a sexual offense.
161. The issue of whether sodomy should be considered a criminal act is beyond the scope of
this Note. Although the sex act itself may have some expressive elements, it is more clearly
related to private conduct.
162. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text (concerning the O'Brien test).
163. Outing involves "identifying, by name, in print, and with as many details as possible,
people who are believed to be homosexual, hoping to force them out of the closet." Cheryl Lavin,
HOMOSEXUAL EXPRESSION
Forced outing pits free speech rights against the right not to speak.
The central debate should focus on the injury to reputation and pri-
vacy. Speech on a public issue is protected by the First Amendment
unless it is maliciously and willfully false. 164 Arguably, because of
society's marginalization of the homosexual community, an individ-
ual's sexual preference is a matter of public concern. 16 5 This result
denies the expressive elements of the victim's silence. 66 Ultimately,
neither the problem of forced outing, nor any other restrictions on the
homosexual community's expression, may be resolved satisfactorily
until courts recognize and value homosexual speech.
IV. THE NEED FOR A BROADER INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The specific abuses of the First Amendment doctrine share a
common element-they undervalue expression that the majority can-
not recognize as reasonable. Consequently, because courts see it as
the speech of Unreason, they exclude this expression from First
Amendment protection. When homoerotic art is compared to the
obscenity doctrine, it must meet the majoritarian community's stan-
dard of morality.167 In defining a community-based model, the First
Amendment becomes a tool of the majority to suppress the speech of
the minority rather than a shield to ensure open expression.
Certainly, there must be some limits to the protections afforded
speech. 6 8 Not all expression adds to the marketplace of ideas; not all
actions are expressive. Abolishing all limits would demean the First
Amendment and erode its usefulness to society. To fulfill the constitu-
tional mandate of the First Amendment, however, exclusions must be
narrowly aimed darts rather than blunderbuss eliminations of speech
that society considers unreasonable.
The Light in the Closet, Chicago Tribune Cl (June 8, 1993). See Signorile, Queer in America at
xviii.xix (cited in note 110); Larry Gross, Contested Closets: The Politics and Ethics of Outing 1-6
(U. of Minnesota, 1993).
164. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (affirming the requirement of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard, but reversing on grounds that the victim was not a
public figure); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988) (requiring proof of "actual
malice" in addition to knowledge of falsity in order to support a claim of emotional distress
resulting from an offensive parody of a public figure); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
271-72,279-80 (1963).
165. But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52 (finding that an attorney's participation in a civil suit
against an alleged murderer did not render him a public figure).
166. See notes 157.59 and accompanying text.
167. See Part Ill.A.1.
168. See Part II.B.
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The basis of the First Amendment lies in the validation of
individual rights rather than the maintenance of majoritarian ideals.
The majority is able to implement its goals and beliefs through the
democratic legislative process. A majoritarian government, however,
requires that all ideas receive equal access to the marketplace.169
Thus, the majority may implement its wishes but cannot exclude
other ideas.
In order to fulfill the First Amendment's purpose, the Court
must expand its current interpretation of protected expression to
include the expression of the counter-majority. The First
Amendment's right to free expression should not be defined by the
majority's relative beliefs. Forms of expression that do not fall within
the standards of the majority, such as those of the homosexual
community, will be overlooked consistently and devalued by this
system. For heterosexual couples, walking down the street holding
hands is a simple act of affection. For lesbians and gay men, it is both
an act of affection and a criticism of society's sexual beliefs and
expectations. It is an assault on those who condemn the gay lifestyle
and, accordingly, may incite criticism, discrimination, and physical
assault.
To ensure the continued variety of viewpoints within society, it
is imperative that courts recognize that expression may assume a
wide array of forms. Some fall neatly into the mold of traditional First
Amendment speech. Others, however, bear an entirely new guise.
Although it is difficult to discern these nontraditional elements, their
diversity necessitates careful scrutiny by the courts.
Correcting the defects in the current interpretation of the First
Amendment is a difficult task. In the long term, simply realizing that
different modes of expression do exist may prove the most fruitful
solution. A more controversial approach might involve a subjective
analysis of the speaker claiming a First Amendment privilege. Each
approach may be criticized, but ultimately, the courts must adopt
some solution to revise the limits on expression.
A. Enhanced Objectivity
One approach is to continue to bombard the courts with images
of homosexuality and those acts of the homosexual community that by
their very nature are expressive. Continued exposure eventually will
breed recognition. Every act that forces homosexuality into public
169. In much the same way, the economic free market uses antitrust law to ensure that no
trade is suppressed by those with a majority share of market power.
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view and the judicial arena enhances its recognition as an acceptable
mode of expression. 170
This process has occurred throughout the history of the First
Amendment.'17  When the majoritarian legislative process restricts
disreputable, unreasonable expression, those silenced invoke the First
Amendment's protection. Initially, categories of exclusions have
denied this speech access to the marketplace. As the frequency of this
speech increases and attacks on the ill-fitting exclusions intensify,
however, courts begin to recognize the expressive elements.
This process of evolution, however, is unsatisfactory. First, it
essentially mirrors and reasserts the majoritarian process. Excluded
speech is suppressed until a majority of the population accepts it as
deserving of protection. 172  Another problem with this waiting ap-
proach is that until this enlightenment occurs, those who seek to
express themselves face inordinate pressures to silence.
73
B. Subjective Analysis
Re-evaluation of the First Amendment is required to recognize
the full extent of expression. To offer First Amendment protection to
counter-majoritarian views, courts must value those views as the
speaker values them. This approach would require judges to offer
valid alternative means to express ideas without running afoul of
proscribed methods. In keeping with the presumption of validity that
speech must entail, any expression would be considered valid and
protected unless it is proven nonexpressive.
This proposition may seem too heavy a burden for judges to
carry. Some would assert that courts must restrict themselves to
evaluation of the law alone, not facts or alternatives. That claim dis-
misses the responsibility that the First Amendment places on courts,
however. To protect individual rights, the judiciary must make some
factual determinations. The majoritarian values of juries cannot limit
this duty.
170. Karst, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 116 (cited in note 9).
171. Cases involving criticism of the government and its officials demonstrate this evolution.
Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (refusing First Amendment protection to
speech advocating the overthrow of the government), with Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)
(overturning a conviction for publicly burning the United States flag).
172. For homosexual expression, this process might be less painful because a significant
portion of society has begun to recognize it as valid.
173. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text (concerning self-censorship).
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This hybrid of objective and subjective determination is not
entirely radical. It already exists in the O'Brien test.174 Courts must
examine the possible alternatives for expression as part of an evalu-
ation of the speaker's interest. Although the current test for expres-
sion is riddled with majoritarian exclusions, 7 5 an additional filter to
identify alternatives would encourage more complete judicial aware-
ness. For example, to come out, homosexuals must possess the
freedom to live an openly gay lifestyle as a means of expression.
Coming out is an inherently individual process. It cannot be attained
by speaking as a group. Thus, forcing judges to realize that there are
no alternatives to the expressive acts required in coming out may
force them to realize the expressive quality of these acts and offer
them adequate protection.
Of course, even this method does not ensure full protection.
Fringe forms of expression may be denied protection because they
could be communicated as effectively in a more traditional form. At
the very least, however, this expansion would require the judiciary to
confront these forms of expression rather than rely on stock exclu-
sions.
Criticism may be leveled at this approach by those who
consider it an unequal application of the laws. This criticism is mis-
guided for two reasons. First, the First Amendment necessarily
implies disparate treatment. It is intended to offer more protection to
viewpoints lacking an equal opportunity to receive expression in the
legislative process. In addition, a subjective approach would not apply
a disparate standard to a minority view. It would require the same
review for all. The difference would lie in the societal factors sur-
rounding different expression. Those seeking to express themselves in
a traditional manner would continue to receive protection, whereas
others simply would receive equal protection.
V. CONCLUSION
If the courts take a broader view of the types of expression
protected by the First Amendment, this recognition could greatly
influence the development of the gay liberation movement, the drive
for homosexual equality in society, and the relation of subordinated
groups to society in general. This new fairness could affect the entire
consciousness of liberation within the gay and lesbian communities. A
174. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
175. See Parts II.A.1 and Il.A.2 (concerning the obscenity and fighting words exclusions).
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new willingness to listen to the expressive subtext of society may relax
the chilling effects of prior interpretations of the First Amendment.
By allowing truly free access to the marketplace of ideas, the exchange
would be the ultimate winner, enriched by the diversity of views.
Potentially, other unheard voices also would begin to receive recogni-
tion from the courts.
Shifting the judicial interpretation of the First Amendment
would alter the way in which the courts treat the First Amendment.
Expression that majoritarian minds have been unable to comprehend
in the past may be revitalized. For example, laws prohibiting solicita-
tion may cease to be a tool for discrimination against gay men seeking
companionship. 116 In addition, the current freeze on openly homoerotic
art would begin to thaw as artists lose the fear that their expressions
could cost them the possibility of government funding. 177
As a result of the expanded voice that this revised interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment would give to marginal expression, those
unheard by society may begin to join the community debate on level
terms. The homosexual community especially would gain from this
protection. Gay men and lesbians would gain the freedom to take
their places in the constellation of ideas and have their beliefs
examined and criticized by society. In addition, the new freedom of
expression would end the role of silence that has kept homosexuals
invisible for so long. Vocal gay activists represent only one small facet
of homosexual expression. The true extent of homosexuality may be
recognized and debated fruitfully only if it is exposed before the whole
of society.
The self-cultivating nature of fringe concepts will limit the
application of this expanded view of expression. Once the broadened
horizons of expression are implemented, they will be filled by previ-
ously marginalized viewpoints. If these ideas are not accepted by the
masses, they gradually will lose force and wither on their own accord.
176. Because of the fear of violence in Ohio, the state legislature has codified a form of the
"heckler's veto" in Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2907.07 (Baldwin 1992), which provides:
Importuning
(B) No person shall solicit a person of the same sex to engage in sexual activity with
the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation is offensive to the other person, or
is reckless in that regard.
See also 11 Del. Code Ann. § 1321 (1987), which provides:
A person is guilty of loitering when:
(5) He loiters or remains in a public place for the purpose of engaging or soliciting
another person to engage in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse ....
177. See Adler, Note, 99 Yale L. J. at 1359-60 n.6 (cited in note 93).
1994] 1105
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
If they do gain a measure of acceptance, then new speech opportuni-
ties will present themselves. As the adherents to a concept receive
societal acceptance, other methods of expression will become available
because political constituencies will ensure legislative representation.
Consequently, when courts question whether alternative means of
expression exist, they will find less of a need to offer added protection
to these views.
Criticism of this expanded model of free speech protection is
likely to come from those who perceive the majoritarian process as the
appropriate forum for fringe beliefs. These forces fear the danger that
open expression may present to society.178 This view ignores the fact
that the impact of any fringe idea on society is directly proportional to
the number of supporters it can accumulate. The answer to these
fears is not to suppress dissent, but to encourage it.
The commitment to ensuring the freedom of speech has allowed
the appearance of many counter-majoritarian beliefs. Because of the
socially constructed view of Reason, however, those who apply the
First Amendment often undervalue expression that they consider
irrational. Instead of strangling these fringe beliefs in their infancy,
courts must expand their horizons and grant these beliefs access to
the marketplace of ideas. Only in this way may we fufil the vision of
the First Amendment.
Brent Hunter Allen*
178. See, for example, American Booksellers Ass'n V. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir.
1985) (describing the detrimental effects of pornography on women in society).
* The Author would like to thank Jamie S. Blosser for the time, patience, and input she
devoted to this Note.
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